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Abstract:  
 
This study aims to analyze the extent to which the mediating role of corporate governance on 
the influence of state ownership on audit findings issued by Audit Board of the Republic of 
Indonesia on State-Owned Enterprises in Indonesia.  
 
The study used a sample of 98 observations (firm-year) during the period of 2010-2014. The 
results indicate that directly in line with predictions, there is a positive influence of the 
degree of state ownership on audit findings, and it is found that the level of state ownership 
has an indirect and negative effect on the governance of state enterprises, resulting in a 
negative impact of corporate governance on the audit.  
 
The results of this study imply that in order to reduce the potential for audit findings, the 
steps that need to be taken by the government gradually are to reduce the state ownership 
portion of SOEs, especially by privatization through stock offerings on the capital market 
and encouraging the implementation good governance in SOEs. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This study aims to analyze the extent to which the corporate governance is capable 
of mediating the influence of state ownership on audit findings on SOEs in 
Indonesia. The main focus of this research is to assess the mediating role of 
corporate governance in explaining the effect of state ownership or privatization on 
the performance of SOEs, particularly audit findings that are still lacking in the 
previous literature. Previous studies have more focused on direct effect of 
privatization on SOE performance. Although many parties agree that privatization 
has a positive impact on the performance of SOEs, but there are still some who 
highlight that empirically it has not been fundamentally proven (Aivazian et al., 
2005; Tsamenyi et al., 2010). Bhagat and Bolton (2008) examining the relationship 
between performance, corporate governance, ownership structure and capital 
structure found that performance is influenced by corporate governance, which 
thereby influencing both capital structure and ownership structure (Giannakopoulou 
et al., 2016). 
 
Xu and Wang (1999), Qiang (2003) and Ang and Ding (2006) found that corporate 
governance structures are strongly influenced by state ownership levels in SOEs. It 
is worthwhile to note that although the state ownership structure has a direct effect 
on performance, the role of corporate governance structures in mediating that 
influence is inevitable. Specifically, in terms of the relationship between corporate 
governance of SOEs ono audit findings, Nguyen and Van Dijk (2012) found that 
SOEs corporate governance can reduce the level of corruption and negative impact 
on corruption. Accordingly, the corporate governance applied by SOEs can 
negatively affect the audit findings. There are at least three contributions to this 
study compared to previous studies. First is the attempt to examine the role of 
corporate governance in mediating the influence of state ownership on audit findings 
issued by Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia (BPK). Second, it provides 
additional empirical evidence of the need for privatization in improving the 
credibility of business management and simultaneously improving corporate 
governance. Thus, the procedural errors, irregularities or fraud that lead to large 
audit findings in the management of SOEs can be minimized.  
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
 
The issue of ownership is particularly important. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that 
the separation of ownership and control in complex organizations can lead to an 
increasing number of agency issues along with the separation of decision-making by 
management and risk coverage to the public (Kurniawan, 2017). In large companies, 
for example public companies, residual claims on common stocks have no 
restrictions, because shareholders are not required to have other roles in the 
organization. Thus, risk is not limited among shareholders, which can lead to greater 
opportunistic management. In terms of the influence of government ownership in 
SOEs‘ Claessens et al. (2002) indicates that as a controller, the state is very 
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concerned to increase the value of state-owned enterprises, which can be driven by 
the desire to earn a large dividend in order to support the increase of state revenues. 
However, on the other hand a very large control by the state will also result in 
declining corporate value and the potential for expropriation of minority 
shareholders (Munawarah et al., 2017; Siallagan et al., 2017). Associated with the 
theory of legitimacy, especially in the public sector, organizational legitimacy is 
generally described as a condition of organizational behavior that is in line with 
expectations of the parties around the organization running its activities (Suchman, 
1995).  
 
Therefore, the nonconformity or failure of the organization in performing its 
functions and responsibilities will likely pose a serious risk to the organizational 
legitimacy. The risks will be aggravated by the growing demands on the 
transparency and accountability of organizations (Power, 2003; Din et al, 2017). 
This, when the legitimacy of the organization becomes diminished, will potentially 
diminish the flow of resources received and adversely affect the achievement of 
organizational goals. Therefore, it is important for organizations to design and 
manage organizational institutions in order to protect or maintain legitimacy 
(Gabrini, 2013). Therefore, in addition to opportunistic behaviors that can underlie 
government ownership in the management of SOEs which then leads to 
appropriation, government ownership in SOEs can also serve as a tool to 
demonstrate the government's performance in order to mobilize legitimacy from the 
public. Ang and Ding (2006) state that this such condition is likely able to stimuli 
the influence, either positive or negative, of ownership on the audit findings. 
Accordingly, this study proposes the hypothesis as follows:  
H1. Government ownership affects audit findings.  
 
In the context of the relationship between corporate governance and audit findings, 
Hermawan and Adinda (2012), Fujianti (2018) have proved that the existence of 
independent commissioners as the most important element in the application of 
GCG has a positive effect on improving the quality of profit. The existence of 
independent commissioner can reduce the existence of accrual discretion or 
management earnings that can reduce the quality of earnings (Wibowo and Ghozali, 
2018). Therefore, their presence in GCG system is expected to be able to supervise 
and control the management in order to always perform the company's management 
according to the standards and comply with the applicable regulations. This 
ultimately will likely be able to reduce negative audit findings and also improve 
assurance in improving or following up on audit findings (Din et al., 2017).  
 
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) found that good governance which is influenced by 
capital structure and ownership structure will affect company performance. In 
addition, opportunistic behavior of controlling and management shareholders can be 
minimized by the application of good GCG practices. This is happened because 
GCG is a means of protecting minority shareholders from the control or 
appropriation of rights by either managers or controlling shareholders (Mitton, 
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2002). Therefore, the application of GCG to SOEs can reduce opportunistic behavior 
that may arise from government ownership and vice versa, can help improve the 
performance and value of companies pursued by the government as the controlling 
shareholder of SOEs. The hypothesis is as follows:  
H2. There is an indirect effect of government ownership on audit findings through 
the application of good governance. 
 
3. Research Methods 
 
This study uses the samples of Indonesian SOEs during the period 2010-2014, based 
on the list of SOEs under the guidance of the Ministry of SOEs. The sample 
selection was conducted using purposive judgment sampling method, with the 
following criteria. First, the SOEs have data on audit findings on inspection 
conducted by BPK during the observation period. Second, the SOEs include 
evaluation result on GCG implementation based on Decree of Secretary of Minister 
of SOE No. SK-16/S.MBU/2012 or Circular Letter of State Ministry of SOE No. S-
168/MBU/2008. Third, the sample have complete data related to all research 
variables studied during the observation period. 
 
Table 1: Overview of Research Sample 
Panel A (sample determination) 
Observation 
(firm-year) 
Number 
of SOES 
SOES data under Ministry of SOEs (2010-2014) 585 117 
Do not have audit finding report (441) - 
Do not include GCG scores on annual reports (46) - 
Number of Final Samples 98 51 
Panel B (Sample Description) 
Observation 
(firm-year) 
Percent 
(%) 
By Industry   
Manufacturing industry 10 10.20 
Financial Services and Insurance 16 16.33 
Professional, scientific and technical services 4 4.08 
Construction 8 8.16 
Water supply, waste management and recycling 1 1.02 
Procurement of electricity, gas, steam / hot water and cold 
air 
7 7.14 
Trade, repair and maintenance of cars and motorcycles 2 2.04 
Mining and excavation 12 12.24 
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries 4 4.08 
Real estate 2 2.04 
Transportation and warehousing 32 32.65 
Final samples by industry 98 100 
By year   
2010 17 17.35 
2011 23 23.47 
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2012 22 22.45 
2013 27 27.55 
2014 9 9.18 
The final sample by year 98 100 
Based on Privatization (Go Public)   
Go Public 28  
Non Go Public 70  
The final sample Based on Privatization (Go Public) 98 100 
 
Based on the criteria for determining the samples, a final sample of 98 firm-year 
observations from 51 SOEs is shown in table 1 panel A. Panel B shows that the 
entire final sample represents 11 industries, in which industrial transportation and 
warehousing sector has the largest number of 32 observations (firm-year) or 32.65% 
of the overall sample. Based on observation year, it is showed that 2014 only has 9 
observations or 9.18% and for 2010 until 2014 the number of samples is in the range 
of 17-27 observations. The number of samples based on privatization (go public) 
categorization shows that as many as 28 observations were classified as privatized 
SOEs and 70 observations were categorized as closed companies. 
 
To answer the problem of research and simultaneously test the hypothesis, hence, 
empirical equation model was used simultaneously with two stage least square: 
 
AUDit = α0 + α 1GCGit + α 2LnAsset + ε1..................................................(1) 
GCGit = β0 + β1GOVit + β2LnAsset + ε1...............................................................(2) 
 
AUD is the audit findings measured by the number of audit findings on the 
examinations conducted by BPK on SOEs. GOV is government ownership of shares 
in state-owned enterprises as measured by percentage of government share 
ownership compared to total shares. GCG is Good Corporate Governance, as 
measured by GCG implementation score on SOEs based on SOE Minister 
regulations, either on self-assessment by SOES or independent valuation result 
appraisal of GCG implementation on SOE using parameter according to Letter of 
Secretary of Minister of SOE No.SK-16/S.MBU/012 on indicators/parameters 
assessment and evaluation of GCG implementation on SOEs. Until the year 2011, 
the assesment used the Circular Letter of State Ministry of SOEs No. S-
168/MBU/2008 on the Implementation of GCG Practices in SOEs. LnASSET as 
control variable, refers to the total of SOE assets as measured by Logarithm Natural 
of total assets owned by SOEs. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
The descriptive statistics provides an overview of the samples used in the study by 
describing mean, median, standard deviation, min and max of each variable studied. 
Based on the sample of research which amounted to 98 observations, it is obtained 
description of the variables as presented in Table 2.  
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Table 2: Description of Variable Statistics 
Information Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max 
Panel A: Sample Overall = 98 Observations (firm-year) 
AUD 19.112 14 18.667 1 129 
FUAUD 43.568 41.245 40.602 0 100 
GOV 89.688 100 16.174 51 100 
IDX 0.285 0 0.454 0 1 
GCG 83.490 83.58 7.167 66.56 96.32 
ASSET 72,759.25 8,436.92 166,860.55 238.81 733,099.76 
Panel B: Privatized SOEs = 28 Observations (firm-year) 
AUD 15.428 13.5 10.300 2 48 
FUAUD 56.893 66.185 42.213 0 100 
GOV 65.76 65.01 8.554 51 85.81 
GCG 87.169 86.725 5.919 75.68 96.32 
ASSET 67,485.12 14,433.63 157,949.4 733,958 733,099.8 
Panel C: Not Privatized SOEs = 70 Observations (firm-year) 
AUD 20.585 14 20.991 1 129 
FUAUD 38.238 25.343 38.979 0 100 
GOV 99.26 100 3.725 73.15 100 
GCG 82.018 82.1 7.128 66.559 94.62 
ASSET 74,868.90 6,094.90 171,355.63 238.81 626,0079.33 
AUD is an auditof the AUDIT BOARD as measured by the number of audit findings on 
audits by AUDIT BOARD on SOES. FUAUD is a follow up on the BPK recommendation as 
measured by the percentage of total follow-up that has been carried out by SOES in 
accordance with the BPK recommendation compared to the total number of BPK's 
recommendations. GOV is the government's shareholding in SOEs as measured by the 
percentage of government share ownership compared to the total shares. IDX, is a 
privatization done on SOEs as measured by dummy, that is the value "1" for privatized 
SOEs and "0" for non-go public SOEs. GCG is Good Corporate Governance, as measured 
by GCG implementation score on SOEs based on SOE Minister regulation, either on self-
assessment by SOEs or independent assessment result. ASSET is the total value of assets 
measured by the absolute value of total assets in billions  rupiah. 
 
Table 2 panel A presents the variables of the overall sample, while panel B and 
panel C presents a sample of privatized SOEs as many as 28 firm-year observations 
and non-privatized as much as 70 firm-year observations of the entire sample. It can 
be seen that the comparison of privatized SOEs and non-go public SOEs, from all 
variables the variables of follow-up of audit findings and GCG on privatized SOEs 
have a higher mean value compared to SOEs that are not in privatization. For 
variables of audit findings and assets, the mean value held by the un-privatized 
SOEs is higher than the mean value of the variables owned by the privatized SOEs. 
This indicates that follow-up on the recommendation of BPK’s audit findings and 
GCG score for privatized SOEs is better than those of un-privatized SOEs. On the 
other hand, the findings of audit and total assets owned by SOEs that do not go 
public are higher than those of privatized SOEs. 
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Table 3: Variable Correlation Analysis 
 
 
 
The first Hypothesis predicts that there is a direct influence of state ownership on 
audit findings, whereas hypothesis two states that there is an indirect influence of 
state ownership on the audit findings of SOEs through the mediating role of 
corporate governance. Table 4 provides an overview of the results of tests on H1 and 
H2. The results show that the model used to examine the direct influence of state 
ownership (GOV) on audit findings (AUD) can explain the variation of audit 
findings by 12.51 percent and significant at 1 percent level. In the test results of this 
model, it can be seen that the direct ownership of the state have a positive and 
significant impact on audit findings with a coefficient of 0.312 at a significance level 
of 5 percent. These results indicate that the data used in this study is in accordance 
with the acceptance of first hypothesis. This means that an increase in state 
ownership of SOEs by 1 percent is more likely to affect the increase of audit 
findings of 0.312. 
 
In addition, it is also found that the assets of SOEs as a control variable has a 
positive and significant impact on audit findings with a coefficient of 5.815 at the 
level of significance of 5 percent. This means that an increase in assets in SOEs by 1 
Variabl
e 
AUD FUAUD GOV GCG IDX LnASSET 
AUD 1.000      
FUAUD 0.076 
(0.455) 
1.000     
GOV 0.136 
(0.181) 
-0.187* 
(0.065) 
1.000    
GCG -0.206** 
(0.041) 
0.330*** 
(0.001) 
-0.332*** 
(0.001) 
1.000   
IDX -0.125 
(0.218) 
0.208** 
(0.039) 
-0.940*** 
(0.000) 
0.326*** 
(0.001) 
1.000  
LnASS
ET 
0.576*** 
(0.000) 
0.064 
(0.526) 
-0175* 
(0.084) 
0.342*** 
(0.000) 
0.171* 
(0.091) 
1.000 
AUD is an auditof the AUDIT BOARD as measured by the number of audit findings on 
audits by AUDIT BOARD on SOES. FUAUD is a follow up on the BPK recommendation 
as measured by the percentage of total follow-up that has been carried out by SOES in 
accordance with the BPK recommendation compared to the total number of BPK's 
recommendations. GOV is the government's shareholding in SOEs as measured by the 
percentage of government share ownership compared to the total shares. IDX, is a 
privatization done on SOEs as measured by dummy, that is the value "1" for privatized 
SOEs and "0" for non-go public SOEs. GCG is Good Corporate Governance, as measured 
by GCG implementation score on SOEs based on SOE Minister regulation, either on self-
assessment by SOEs or independent assessment result. LnASSET is the total SOE asset, as 
measured by logarithm natural of total assets owned by SOEs. 
* **, **, * = P-value significant 1%, 5%, 10%. 
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percent will more likely be able to affect the increase of audit findings of 5.815. In 
other words, the higher the asset of SOEs, the higher the audit findings range. 
Moreover, the test results on GCG variable in this model did not show any 
significant effect on audit findings. 
 
Table 4: Hypothesis Testing Results 
Variable Sign 
Direct Influence 
(AUD) 
Indirect Influence 
GCG AUD 
Intercept ( ? ) -123.494** 
(0.037) 
76.795*** 
(0.000) 
69.112 
(0.223) 
GOV ( ? ) 0.312** 
(0.035) 
-0.124*** 
(0.001) 
- 
GCG ( - ) 0.245 
(0.396) 
- -2.262** 
(0.034) 
LnAsset ( ? ) 5.815*** 
(0.002) 
1.106*** 
(0.000) 
8.589*** 
(0.001) 
N  98 98 98 
Prob. > F / chi2  0.005*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 
Adj. R-Squared  - 17.72 - 
Wald Chi2  12.51 - 11.75 
AUD is an auditof the AUDIT BOARD as measured by the number of audit findings on 
audits by AUDIT BOARD on SOES. FUAUD is a follow up on the BPK recommendation as 
measured by the percentage of total follow-up that has been carried out by SOES in 
accordance with the BPK recommendation compared to the total number of BPK's 
recommendations. GOV is the government's shareholding in SOEs as measured by the 
percentage of government share ownership compared to the total shares. IDX, is a 
privatization done on SOEs as measured by dummy, that is the value "1" for privatized 
SOEs and "0" for non-go public SOEs. GCG is Good Corporate Governance, as measured 
by GCG implementation score on SOEs based on SOE Minister regulation, either on self-
assessment by SOEs or independent assessment result. LnASSET is the total SOE asset, as 
measured by logarithm natural of total assets owned by SOEs. 
* **, **, * = P-value significant 1%, 5%, 10%. 
 
To asses the indirect influence of corporate governance, table 4 shows that by 
controlling state-owned assets, state ownership negatively affects GGC, with a 
significant coefficient of -0.124 at 1 percent level. Furthermore, GCG also has a 
negative effect on audit findings with negative coefficient of -0.124 and significant 
at 5 percent. Accordingly, an increase of state ownership of SOEs by 1 percent is 
potential to decrease GCG score equal to 0.124, and a decrease of 1 in GCG score 
will more likely be able to increase of audit findings 2.262 basis point. This result, 
henceforth, corresponds to that predicted on H2 stating that there is an indirect 
influence of state ownership on the audit findings of SOEs through the mediating 
role of corporate governance. 
 
The results of this study support Xu and Wang (1999) and Qiang (2003) stating that 
corporate governance in SOEs is heavily influenced by state ownership. In this such 
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context, large state ownership can reduce the quality of governance practices in 
SOEs, and thus by improving corporate governance of SOEs should be initiated by 
reducing the government's involvement and ownership in SOEs. In addition, in 
general this study is also consistent with the results of Bhagat and Bolton's (2008) 
research which found that corporate governance affects the company's performance. 
More specifically it supports the findings of Nguyen and Van Dijk (2012) which 
concluded that the corporate governance can reduce the level of corruption occurring 
in state-owned enterprises and the negative impact of corruption on corporate 
growth. 
 
Therefore, although the BPK’s audit findings do not fully describe the fraud that 
occurred in the company, at least the results of this study is able to provide different 
perspective from Lisic et al. (2014) who found that most state-owned enterprises in 
China had a negative effect on the fraud that occurred in the company. Basically, the 
findings of this study supports Wahyuni's findings (2011) which shows that 
government ownership negatively affects the performance of SOEs in Indonesia. 
Thus, to reduce the risk of government appropriation efforts, opportunistic 
management or any possibility that causes increasing audit findings, it is necessary 
to start by reducing the level of state ownership of SOEs. The study of Munawarah 
et al. (2017) also confirms that the level of state ownership has a negative effect on 
the implementation of governance. With the reduced state ownership, it will 
automatically become a trigger for SOEs to further improve the implementation of 
good corporate governance. The implementation of good governance in SOEs 
furthermore will enhance the SOE management activities to be more professional, 
appropriate and in accordance with the applicable rules. 
 
5. Sensitivity Tests between State Ownership and Privatization 
 
There are at least 3 methods of privatization, namely directly offered to investors, to 
management and or employees and to the public through the capital market. In the 
Indonesian context, the main method used is through the public offering of shares in 
the stock market (go public in Indonesia Stock Exchange/IDX). This is expected to 
further encourage the implementation of good governance. In addition, Megginson 
et al. (2004) found that privatization options were influenced by the political, 
institutional and economic factors of a country with some of the objectives of 
privatization being to increase government revenues, reduce government 
intervention, as a strategy to develop the capital market, to increase efficiency, 
improve the ability of SOEs to compete and increase the compliance of SOEs in 
carrying out regulations, particularly related to regulations on the capital market. To 
examine the effectiveness of such privatization and as a sensitivity test on the 
measurement of state ownership variable, in addition to using the measurement of 
percentage of state ownership (GOV), the test of state ownership is also measured 
by dummy variable (IDX), in distinguishing between public and non-go public 
companies. Table 5 shows that the model used to test the direct influence of state 
ownership (IDX) on audit findings (AUD) can explain variations in audit findings 
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by 13.09 percent and significant at 10 percent level. In the test results, it is seen that 
directly, privatized SOEs have a lower (negative) audit findings of 10.497 compared 
with non-public SOEs and the difference is significant at the level of 5 percent. 
 
Table 5: Sensitivity Test Results of State Ownership on SOEs with Privatization 
Through Capital Market 
Variable Sign 
Direct Influence 
(AUD) 
Indirect Influence 
GCG AUD 
Intercept ( ? ) -90.794** 
(0.045) 
64.236*** 
(0.000) 
64.167 
(0.265) 
IDX ( - ) -10.497* 
(0.050) 
4.351*** 
(0.002) 
- 
GCG ( - ) 0.229 
(0.425) 
- -2.183** 
(0.042) 
LnAsset ( ? ) 5.800*** 
(0.002) 
1.114*** 
(0.000) 
8.487 
(0.001) 
N  98 98 98 
Prob. > F / chi2  0.004*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 
Adj. R-Square  - 17.41 - 
Wald Chi2  13.09 - 11.92 
AUD, is an auditof the AUDIT BOARD as measured by the number of audit findings on 
audits by AUDIT BOARD on SOES. FUAUD, is a follow up on the Audit Board's 
recommendation as measured by the percentage of total follow-up that has been carried out 
by SOES in accordance with the Audit Board recommendation compared to the total 
number of Audit Board's recommendations. GOV, is the Government's shareholding in 
SOES as measured by the percentage of government share ownership compared to the total 
shares. IDX, is a Privatization done on SOES as measured by dummy, the value "1" for 
SOES goes public and "0" for non-go public SOES. GCG, is Good Corporate Governance, 
as measured by GCG implementation score score on SOES based on SOES Minister 
regulation, either on self-assessment by SOES or independent assessment result. LnASET, 
is the total SOES asset, as measured by Logarithm Natural Total Assets owned by SOES. 
* **, **, * = P-value significant 1%, 5%, 10%. 
 
Furthermore, Table 5 shows that publicly owned SOEs have higher GGC scores of 
4.351 compared to GCG scores on non-public SOEs, and significant at 1 percent 
level. With the higher GCG, the audit findings on provatized SOEs were lower by 
2.183 compared with audit findings on non-go public SOEs, where the GCG score 
difference and audit findings were significant at 1 percent and 5 percent 
respectively. The sensitivity test results show that while using different state 
ownership measures, there is no difference with the previous test results. This means 
that the research models developed in this study are robust in explaing the important 
role of corporate governance as a mediating variable on the effect of state ownership 
on audit findings. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
This study used a sample of 98 observations (firm-year) during the period of 2010-
2014 aiming at analyzing the role of corporate governance on the influence of state 
ownership on audit findings of SOEs in Indonesia. The results shows that there is a 
direct positive influence of the level of state ownership on audit findings. This result 
is robust when tested by distinguishing between the sample of SOEs that have been 
privatized and unprivatized SOEs. Specifically, go public SOEs have lower audit 
findings compared to non-public SOEs. Meanwhile, using the simultaneous two 
stage least square testing in analyzing the indirect influence of state ownership on 
audit findings, it is found that the level of state ownership has a negative effect on 
the governance of state enterprises.  
 
Furthermore, this causes a negative effect between corporate governance and audit 
findings. Such results may provide additional explanation for the positive influence 
of state ownership on audit findings, ie when state ownership is dominant in a SOE, 
it can reduce the quality of good governance practices. The poor corporate 
governance in SOEs can lead to increased audit findings on the SOE. These results 
are also robust for two measurements of government ownership in SOEs, using 
variables of government ownership and privatization. In general, the conclusion of 
this study implies that in order to reduce the potential for audit findings, some steps 
that need to be taken by the government in stages are to reduce the state ownership 
of state-owned enterprises, especially by privatization through stock offerings in the 
capital market and to encourage the implementation of good governance in SOEs. 
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